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PREFACE 
An expert system for auditing data communications was 
developed. This system assists an auditor in performing an 
Electronic Data Processing (EDP) audit of a data communica-
tion network. The expert system has several features 
specific to the auditing profession. These features include 
documentation of work performed, presentation of preliminary 
. findings, drafting the audit report, and determination of 
the audit opinion. A copy of the expert system developed 
for this study is available through the Computing and 
Information Science Department of Oklahoma State University. 
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Computers in the Audit Function 
Today, computers are being widely used by the audit 
profession. Historically, much of a company's computer data 
was stored on mainframe computers and minicomputers. Access 
to the computer was generally limited to obtaining reports 
that would assist the auditor in the manual process of 
performing an audit. The programs that created these 
reports were usually developed by a specialized group of 
Electronic Data Processing (EDP) auditors. 
The development of the personal computer has 
accelerated the process of computerization for the audit 
profession. The laptop computer was an especially important 
development because it allowed auditors to take computing on 
the road. The auditor can now use the personal computer to 
perform data analysis, document work, draft audit reports, 
and communicate their findings to management. 
To date, most audit applications have involved the use 
of electronic spreadsheets, word processors, and data base 
applications. In addition, computers are being used for 
audit scheduling and electronic communication known as 
E-mail. 
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A relatively new field is the development of audit 
expert systems. These systems will automate the audit 
process by analyzing audit data and generating recommenda-
tions. These systems have many potential benefits cited in 
the literature. Chapter II will address the benefits in 
detail. A summary of the benefits follows: 
o Reauced cost 
o Faster audits 
o Higher quality audits 
o More consistent quality 
o New auditor training 
o Providing time for new services 
o Preservation of expertise 
Intent of Study 
The intent of this study is to determine the features 
needed in an expert system that will be used by internal 
auditors and to implement these features by developing an 
expert system for auditing data communications networks. 
The features needed in an audit expert system were 
determined by a review of literature and the author's own 
experience as an EDP auditor. These features are described 
in detail in Chapter II and are listed below in summary. 
They are the following: 
o Collect and evaluate audit evidence 
o Document user input 
o Process uncertain user input 
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o Explain why conclusions are drawn in a way that will 
train new auditors 
o Identify audit exceptions and determine which should go 
in the final report 
o Determine the audit opinion 
These features were implemented in an expert system 
that will assist an EDP auditor in performing an audit of a 
data communications network. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
This section provides background information related to 
this thesis. It identifies the current method of performing 
audits, current audit expert system prototypes, and features 
needed in an audit expert system. It is composed of the 
following sections: 
o Domain Information 
o Benefits of an Audit Expert System 
o Appropriateness of Audit Domain 
o Review of Current Audit Expert System Prototypes 
o Features Needed in an Audit Expert System 
Domain Information 
Auditing Function Description 
The function of internal audit is to be the eyes and 
ears of corporate management. It is internal audit's task 
to review all aspects of a company's business for compliance 
with company policies and procedures. Internal audit 
reviews all company operations to determine whether the 
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system of internal control is adequate and functioning in a 
way that protects the assets of the company. 
Data is one of the assets of the company. Thus, all 
data processing areas are subject to review by audit to 
determine whether controls are adequate to protect data from 
unauthorized disclosure, modification, or loss. The data 
communications network is one of the data processing areas 
reviewed by EDP auditors. 
Audit Methodology 
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The present audit methodology described in the follow-
ing paragraphs is used by the author at E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours and Company. Other organizations would use a 
similar methodology; however, there may be some differences. 
Any expert system that replaces the present methodology must 
provide similar capabilities. 
Audits are performed by following the steps of an 
"audit program", which is a checklist of questions and test 
procedures. The purpose of the audit program is to ensure 
completeness and consistency between audits of the same 
subject. Audit programs contain some of the knowledge used 
by auditors, but do not document the advanced judgments of 
experienced or expert auditors. The audit program that was 
used as the basis for the development of this study can be 
found in Appendix A. 
All work completed while following the audit program is 
documented in "audit workpapers". They document the 
responses to questions and the results of testing. Work-
papers are kept for future use. They are helpful to the 
auditor preparing for the audit the next time it is sched-
uled. 
Potential problems identified during an audit are 
reported to line management with auditing's recommendation 
for corrective action. These potential problems are docu-
mented in a preliminary audit report (PAR). The PAR is also 
kept in the workpapers. The significant PARs will be 
documented in a formal report to line management and their 
supervision. 
Additionally, an audit opinion is furnished to manage-
ment on the adequacy of controls in the area reviewed. The 
opinions given are strong, adequate, or weak. 
Benefits of an Audit Expert System 
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A review of literature cites many potential benefits of 
using expert systems in auditing. These benefits include 
reduced cost, faster audits, higher quality audits, more 
consistent quality, new auditor training, providing time for 
new services, and preservation of expertise. 
Audit costs should be reduced since audits can be 
performed faster. Also, the expert system could help train 
new auditors reducing training cost and the amount of 
supervision needed during an audit [2, 5, 6, 11]. 
Audits may be performed faster because the expert 
system would prompt the auditor with only necessary tasks. 
This would keep them from being sidetracked. Also, audit 
time would be reduced because the system would make many of 
the time-consuming decisions for the auditor [11]. 
Audit quality may be improved when an expert system is 
used because judgments are being made based on an expert's 
knowledge. Also, an expert system should eliminate the 
possibility that audit steps might be skipped accidentally 
[2, 4, 11]. 
Audit quality may be more nearly consistent because all 
auditors are using the same procedures and knowledge base 
and personal auditor bias should have less effect on the 
outcome of an expert system [3, 6, 11]. 
Expert systems should provide a simpler way to train 
new auditors. Help screens within the expert system should 
explain to the new auditor what they are doing and why it 
needs to be done. This will greatly reduce the amount of 
direct supervision needed for new auditors and could reduce 
the associated training costs [3, 11]. 
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Due to the time savings anticipated above, there should 
be more time for providing new services to clients. Instead 
of spending a large amount of time "pushing papers", the 
auditor can perform more analytical services for their 
clients (4, 11]. 
When experienced auditors transfer or leave the 
company, a large amount of auditing expertise can be lost. 
Expert systems can be a method of retaining this knowledge 
so other auditors can use it and learn from it [3]. 
Appropriateness of Audit Domain 
Hayes-Roth, Waterman, and Lenat [9] give two important 
criteria for choosing domains for expert systems. They say 
you should choose a specialty area that does not rely on a 
lot of common sense, and the task should not be too easy or 
too difficult for a human expert to perform. 
An expert system which is limited in scope to a par-
ticular audit subject should be a sufficiently narrow 
specialty. The expert system to audit data communications 
networks fits the first criteria. The proposed system also 
meets the second criteria. Instead of relying on common 
sense, there are specific internal controls that are 
reviewed in each subject area. 
Much of the information used by auditors in assessing 
internal controls can be either qualified or quantified, so 
it can be entered in an expert system. Other decision 
support systems, like modeling, are not able to process the 
large amount of qualitative data involved in audit judg-
ments, so expert systems are the best application choice [3, 
8). 
Another criteria considered to be essential for expert 
systems is that there are people within the domain that are 
considered to be experts and that they perform better than 
novices [5]. This criteria is also met by the audit func-
tion. Considerable training is needed to be an expert 
auditor. Also, expert auditors are better performers than 
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novice auditors [3]. 
Another aspect of auditing is that it is an iterative 
process. The information learned at one point suggests 
further questions that need to be asked related to that 
information. This corresponds to the way expert systems ask 
only relevant questions based on answers to previous ques-
tions [2]. 
Review of Current Audit Expert 
System Prototypes 
Several prototype systems have been developed to audit 
specific subject areas. No general auditing expert system 
has been developed. These expert systems are described 
below to give an overview of existing systems. All of them 
were reviewed by Chu [3] and Connell [5]. 
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EDP-EXPERT provides a general review of all EDP inter-
nal controls. Its primary purpose is for use by external 
auditors when they are determining if they can rely on 
computer internal control systems. 
AUDITOR is used by external auditors to determine if 
the allowance for bad debt is reasonable. Thus, the 
knowledge domain of this system is very narrow scope. 
ICES is used to review internal controls in the area of 
accounts receivable transactions. The system provides 
assistance for less experienced auditors. 
CFILE is an expert system used to evaluate banks, 
specifically their reserve for bad loans. The system is 
designed for senior auditors. 
CHECKGAAP is used by experienced external auditors to 
verify compliance with the United Kingdom Companies Act. 
The primary similarity of these systems is that they 
are developed generally for external auditors, but do not 
cover internal controls in the detail that internal auditors 
would. Also, most of these ay~ems are targeted for the 
experienced user instead of the new auditor. 
Features Needed in an Audit 
Expert System 
There are several features that would be necessary in 
an audit expert system. Some of these features would be 
unique to the auditing profession. These features were 
determined based on related literature and the author's 
personal experience as an EDP auditor. The features that 
are implemented in the expert system developed for this 
study are the following: 
Collect and Evaluate Audit Evidence 
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This is a basic feature of the audit process. Data is 
collected and evaluated by the auditor. The expert system 
must be able to prompt the user to enter the data needed for 
making conclusions [2]. 
Document User Input 
Workpapers are a current necessity of the audit 
process. This is also true for an expert system. All 
auditor answers and expert system conclusions must be 
documented [2]. 
Process Uncertain User Input 
The expert system must be flexible. Expert auditor's 
judgment is sometimes fuzzy. They are not always 100 
percent sure of their facts or conclusions [1]. 
When people are asked to give an indication of how 
certain.they are about some situation, the results can vary 
widely. The best way to reduce this effect is to separate 
the uncertain data into as many sub-components as possible. 
Some of these may be objectively answered reducing the 
overall uncertainty of the problem [10]. 
Explain Why Conclusions Are Drawn in a 
Way That Will Train New Auditors 
Using the expert as a training tool for new auditors is 
one of the desired benefits of the system. Standard expla-
nation facilities normally tell why a question is being 
asked based on a line of reasoning approach. A new auditor 
needs to know more including background information on the 
question [10]. 
Identify Audit Exceptions and Determine 
Which Should Go in the Final Report 
When the expert system reaches the conclusion that 
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there is a potential exposure, it must document this in a 
preliminary audit report (PAR). The PAR should document the 
problem, potential exposure, and the recommended solution 
[ 2] • 
Determine the Audit Opinion 
An overall opinion is also determined for each audit. 
This opinion can be used by management to determine the 
state of the internal controls within the area audited. 
There are three opinions: strong, adequate, and weak [2]. 
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CHAPTER III 
PROJECT LIFE CYCLE 
System Concept and Feasibility 
There are several factors that explain why this project 
was chosen for study. 
First, expert systems are still very new in the field 
of auditing. The complexity of auditing has slowed their 
development. Most of the existing prototype systems do not 
address internal controls at a depth sufficient for internal 
audit. 
Second, audit work has several special needs unique to 
the profession. These features are documented in the last 
section of Chapter II. Their implementation is described in 
the Software Design and Coding section of this chapter. 
Some of these features, such as providing a high level of 
explanation and determining an audit opinion, are a signif i-
cant step forward from current systems. 
Third, based on the expected benefits of expert systems 
to auditing, there are significant benefits to be obtained 
from developing a usable expert system. 
Finally, this project is closely related to the au-
thor's profession as an EDP auditor. The expert system that 
has been developed should be helpful in performing data 
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communications audits. 
The feasibility of an audit expert system has already 
been shown in the literature review in Chapter II. There 
have been several prototype systems developed that have 
obtained some level of success. The system developed for 
this study provides additional features to make it more 
useful to an auditor. 
User Requirements Gathering and Analysis 
The review of liter~ture relating to audit expert 
systems suggested several requirements for an audit expert 
system. In addition, the present audit methodology suggests 
the need for additional requirements. The requirements that 
were implemented in this study are the following: 
o Collect and Evaluate Audit Evidence - The expert system 
must be able to prompt the user to enter the data 
needed for making conclusions and then evaluate that 
data to reach conclusions. 
o Document User Input - The expert system must be able to 
document the work performed during the audit. This 
takes the form of workpapers which are a current 
necessity of the audit process. All auditor answers 
and expert system conclusions must be documented. 
o Process Uncertain User Input - The expert system must 
allow the auditor to express their certainty in facts 
that may not be clearly true or false. 
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o Explain Why Conclusions Are Drawn in a Way That Will 
Train New Auditors - The expert system must be able to 
be used as a training tool for new auditors. Also, the 
explanation facility should be able to tell why a 
question is being asked. This explanation would 
describe the internal control risk associated with each 
choice. 
o Identify Audit Exceptions and Determine Which Should Go 
in the Final Report - The expert system must be able to 
determine potential exposures and document them in a 
preliminary audit report (PAR). The PAR should docu-
ment the problem, potential exposure, and the recom-
mended solution. 
o Determine the Audit Opinion - The expert system must be 
able to determine an overall opinion of the state of 
internal controls within the area being audited. The 
three opinions that it must decide between are: 
strong, adequate, and weak. 
Software Design and Coding 
Expert System Shell 
The expert system was developed using the Insight 2 + 
expert system shell, which uses a production rule language. 
A rule is the basic unit of the knowledge base. It contains 
information about what conclusions can be drawn based on 
particular facts. Facts are information supplied by the 
user of the system and the knowledge base developer. 
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Insight 2 + allows for object facts (has a characteristic 
associated with it), simple facts (true or false), numeric 
facts (integer or reals), and string facts (text value). 








115 is there manual control of dial access 
dial access is available on the network 
the operator manually controls dial access 
manual control of dial access reviewed 
FILE manual control document 
manual control of dial access reviewed 
FILE no manual control document 
Figure 1. Example of a Production Rule 
The above rule shows some of the complexity and flexi-
bility of the system. The RULE keyword identifies this as a 
rule statement and gives it a name that can be used with the 
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debugging/tracing tools provided by Insight 2 +. The next 
two lines (IF/AND) give the condition being evaluated by the 
rule. The next two lines (THEN/AND) give the conclusion and 
action to be taken if the condition is true. The last two 
lines (ELSE/AND) give the conclusion and action to be taken 
if the condition is false. 
Insight 2 + Facilities 
Some of the major features of the Insight 2 + expert 
system shell are the following: 
o Facts and conclusions can be initialized at the start 
of the program. This is a very useful feature during 
testing. It allows specific tests to be completed 
without requiring the developer to repeatedly respond 
to all preliminary questions. 
o An interface is .furnished to access DBASE III data base 
files. This could allow the knowledge base to make use 
of existing data base files. 
o The testing/debugging facilities allow you to trace the 
steps that the expert system followed in reaching its 
present point within the knowledge base. 
o It is possible to call other executable modules from 
the expert system. These could provide further func-
tions that are not supplied by the expert system shell. 
o It is possible to "jump" to another expert system. 
This is done through the CHAIN command. This can be 
used to divide knowledge into logical subdivisions. It 
also can increase the maximum size of an application. 
Development Methodology 
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Expert system development lends itself to an iterative 
development methodology. The first pass at developing the 
expert system was to write the first rule which subdivided 
the problem into the major areas that must be reviewed to 
complete the audit. A second iteration developed rules to 
cover what must be accomplished for each of these major 
areas to be reviewed. on further iterations, these subareas 
are further broken down to one or more questions that allow 
specific policies and procedures to be reviewed. 
General Features of the Application 
The knowledge base for this application consists of 
seven modules with a total of 83 rules and 401 facts. The 
expert system was designed and developed as seven knowledge 
base modules that are linked using the Insight 2 + CHAIN 
command. 
Splitting the expert system into seven knowledge bases 
modularized the system along subsections of the audit 
program. It also allowed development and testing to be 
completed in a phased approach and shielded each module from 
changes made to any other module. 
The audit application that has been developed differs 
from many expert systems. Its goal is to review all areas 
applicable to a data communications audit. When it finds a 
potential problem with security or integrity of the network, 
it notes the problem and continues its search for other 
problem areas. Many expert systems are designed to find the 
first problem and then stop. To have the system search for 
all problems, the goal had to be written as "controls re-
viewed" instead of "find a potential audit exception". 
The following sections describe how each of the fea-
tures of the expert system were designed and developed. 
Collect and Evaluate Audit Evidence 
This feature of the expert system is, of course, the 
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backbone of the system. The other features enhance the 
system's basic usefulness, but collection and evaluation of 
audit evidence are the heart of the system. 
The design of the expert system was based primarily on 
an audit program for reviewing data communications networks. 
This provided a general set of questions that are asked 
during a data communications audit. This audit program can 
be found as Appendix A. 
Additional questions were developed based on the 
author's experience in performing data communications 
audits. The author's experience was especially helpful in 
developing the explanations for why each question was being 
asked. 
Document User Input 
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This feature is accomplished by use of the Insight 2 + 
FILE command. Figure 1 shows an example production rule 
where the FILE statement causes the text described as 
"manual control document" to be written to an ASCII file. 
The "manual control document" text is described later in the 
program by use of the DISPLAY statement such as the one 
shown in Figure 2 on the next page. Variable information 
can be included in the DISPLAY statement to document numeric 
or character string facts enter.ed by the user. 
Each of the seven modules in which the knowledge base 
has been separated has its own log file where the expert 
system writes its documentation. There can be only one open 
file at a time so it is necessary to write both the 
workpapers and the audit report to the log file at the same 
time. 
DISPLAY dial access protection par A 
c. Manual activation/deactivation of lines 
is not used to protect dial in lines 
See item B above 
Figure 2. Example DISPLAY Statement 
A basic program was written to combine the log files 
from the seven modules and then separate the workpapers and 
audit report into two files. This program is listed in 
Appendix B - Log Program Listing. The workpapers resulting 
from the system test are listed in Appendix C - Workpapers 
Test Results. The audit reports resulting from the system 
test are listed in Appendix D - Audit Report Test Results. 
Typically, workpapers are saved until the next time an 
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audit is performed at the site. These help the next auditor 
prepare for the assignment. This can also be done with the 
expert system. The expert system and the user responses to 
questions can be saved to disk. This can be reloaded at 
another time. The user can review the previous responses 
and change the responses that are different. 
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Process Uncertain User Input 
Some of the data processed by the expert system is 
judgmental. For example, the question, "Are data sets 
adequately protected?" requires the auditor performing the 
audit to make a judgment. This type of question may be 
difficult to answer either yes or no, and the auditor may 
not be certain of their answer. 
There are several examples of this type of question in 
the knowledge base. Uncertainty is handled by using the 
confidence level facility provided by the expert system 
shell. Instead of answering true or false to this type of 
question, the user is prompted to adjust a confidence bar 
from zero to 100 by using the left and right cursor keys. 
Figure 3 shows an example CONFIDENCE statement which causes 
the associated facts to be queried with the confidence bar 




but access policy not needed 
Dial access protection F 
updates and access to control 
is adequate 
and routing tables 
Figure 3. Example Confidence Statement 
The expert system can process the confidence bar 
response in several ways. A threshold value can be set that 
determines whether the fact is considered true or false. 
Normally, the threshold is set at 50, but this can be set 
for each question. Another method of processing the 
confidence level is to use the Insight 2 + CONF function, 
which will return a numeric value from zero to 100 
representing the confidence level. This function can be 
used in a conditional statement of the production rule 
language. 
Explain Why Conclusions Are Drawn in a 
Way That Will Train New Auditors 
Standard expert system shell explanation function tells 
the user why a question was asked based on the current line 
of reasoning. The expert system that has been developed for 
this study uses the Insight 2 + EXPAND feature to provide 
additional assistance to the user regarding why a question 
is asked. 
22 
Figure 4 on the next page shows an example EXPAND 
statement. This statement repeats the original question, 
provides additional background information, explains what 
exposure is being reviewed, and explains what the auditor 
should look for before answering the question. The type of 
information provided to the user should improve the quality 
of their answers and provide training to auditors unfamiliar 
with data communications audits. 
EXPAND outgoing ports protected 
Review security for outgoing ports and modems of the 
callback system. If someone can dial into the outgoing 
port, they may be able to gain unauthorized access to 
the system unless the phone system or modem stops them. 
Is there some method to block attempts to gain access 
through the outgoing ports? If so, answer TRUE. 
Otherwise, answer FALSE. 
Test of callback systems show that some are vulnerable 
to a hacker calling an outgoing port. The callback 
system will not answer the hacker, but the next time 
the callback system uses that outgoing port to try to 
connect to a legitimate user, it will answer the call 
without knowing. If the hacker plays a recording of a 
dial tone, the callback system will assume it got an 
outgoing line and dial the number. The hacker can then 
simulate answering the phone and send the computer tone 
to connect to the network. 
Some systems get around this by requiring the caller to 
reverify their identity. Also, many phone systems can 
configure a phone number for outgoing calls only. The 
caller then gets a busy signal or a message that the 
number is invalid. 
Figure 4. Example EXPAND Statement 
Identify Audit Exceptions and Determine 
Which Should Go in the Final Report 
Audit exceptions are determined based on the user 
responses to questions in the knowledge base. When the 
expert system determines there is an audit exception, it is 
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displayed on the screen. Exceptions that are to be included 
in the audit report are also written to the log file. 
Figure 5 on the next page shows an example DISPLAY statement 
for a PAR. The information in brackets is variable 
information that the expert system completes as it is 
executing. 
DISPLAY terminal id par 
NETWORK TERMINAL IDS 
LOCATION: [location name] 
PAR NO. [total pars (2,0)] 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: [date pars submitted] 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: [pars submitted to] 
The network being reviewed has a method of identifying 
authorized terminals from unauthorized terminals. 
However, this feature is not being used. This would 
allow unauthorized devices to be added to the network, 
which increases the likelihood of unauthorized access 
to the system and makes network maintenance more 
difficult. 
We recommend the feature to identify authorized 
terminals be used. 
Figure 5. Example PAR DISPLAY Statement 
Determine the Audit Opinion 
The expert system has implemented the feature that 
determines the audit opinion by maintaining a counter that 
is incremented each time a PAR is documented. Figure 6 on 
the next page shows how this is accomplished in a rule. As 
part of the conclusion of the rule, the variable "total 
opinion" is incremented by adding 1. This increment can 
vary based on the severity of the exception. The variable 
"total pars" is used to keep track of how many PARs have 
been written. The variable "total pars" is always 
incremented by 1. 
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The amount the counter is incremented varies depending 
on the severity of the PAR. As designed, it could range 
from zero with no upward limit. The smallest increment used 
in the expert system was .5 and the largest was 2. For 
simplicity, these increments were determined during the 
expert system development phase by the author, who has 
experience with the significance of the various audit 
exceptions. A better approach would be to survey several 
expert data communications auditors and compute an average 












170 to tell if terminal ids not used 
control or routing tables are used 
NOT updates and access to control and routing tables is 
adequate 
control table usage reviewed 
total opinion := total opinion + 1 
total pars := total pars + 1 
ASK workpaper reference for control table description 
FILE control table par w 
FILE control table par r 
DISPLAY control table par 
Figure 6. Example Rule With Opinion Calculation 
Each of the three opinions have an associated counter 
range. These ranges were also determined during the expert 
system development phase by the author. The ranges for the 
opinions are shown in Table I on the next page. 
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The opinion that is determined corresponds to the range 
the opinion counter falls within. For example, if the 
counter is 3.5 the opinion is strong. For simplicity, these 
ranges were determined by the author based on his experience 
with data communications audits. A better approach would be 
to obtain an average of the ratings of several expert 
auditors. This has been left for future work. 
The production rules that determine the opinion are 
similar to the one shown in Figure 7. The display named 
"adequate r" is shown to the user if the opinion counter 
falls in the range from 2.5 up to 8. Figure 8 on the next 





















430 to tell if opinion 
total opinion >= 2.5 
total opinion < 8 
opinion stated 
DISPLAY adequate 
stated is adequate 
FILE adequate r 
Figure 7. Example of Opinion Generating Rule 
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DISPLAY adequate r 
(pars submitted to] 
[location name] 
[date pars submitted] 
DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
[location name] 
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All controls have been reviewed. Based on the 
findings, the overall opinion for data communications 
is an adequate control environment. Detailed audit 
comments are attached for your review. 
Your response to the detail comments is requested 
within sixty days. 
Figure 8. Example Opinion DISPLAY Statement 
System Testing 
The expert system was tested during development using 
the unit test method. The goal of the unit test was to 
assure all statements of all rules were executed and that 
they performed as designed. 
The next phase of testing was conducted after all 
system development was completed. This phase is normally 
called a system test. Its purpose was to test the system in 
as near to actual audit conditions as possible. Actual 
field testing of the system was not conducted because it 
could not be coordinated with the audit schedule for 1989. 
The system test was completed by using five sets of 
audit workpapers as a basis for test data. The test data 
was entered into the system which produced a set of 
workpapers and an audit report for each test. The 
workpapers and audit reports generated by the tests can be 
found in Appendix c - Workpaper Test Results and Appendix D 
- Audit Report Test Results. The author was involved with 
three of these audits. The other two were completed by 
other EDP auditors. 
The test results were compared to the actual audit 
findings that were generated by the auditor who performed 
the audit. The comparisons that were completed were the 
following: 
o Opinions 
o Total Number PARs 
o Number of PARS That Were the Same 
o Number of PARs That Were Different 
Table II on the following page lists the results of the 
comparison. Following the table the results are also shown 
graphically in Figures 9, 10, and 11. Figure 9 shows a 
comparison of the opinions generated by the expert system 
and the auditor. Figure 10 shows a comparison of the total 
number of PARs generated by the expert system and the 
auditor. Figure 11 shows a comparison of the PARs that were 
not found by both the expert system and the auditor. 
Following Table II and the graphs, each of the five tests 
are described with an explanation of any variances between 




SYSTEM TEST RESULTS COMPARISON 
Comparison Actual Test 
Test 1 
Opinions Adequate Adequate 
Total Number PARS 4 5 
PARS That Were the Same 4 4 
PARs That Were Different 0 1 
Test 2 
Opinions Strong Adequate 
Total Number PARS 4 3 
PARS That Were the Same 4 3 
PARs That Were Different 0 0 
Test 3 
Opinions Adequate Adequate 
Total Number PARs 5 3 
PARS That Were the Same 5 3 
PARs That Were Different 0 0 
Test 4 
Opinions Adequate Adequate 
Total Number PARs 4 5 
PARS That Were the Same 4 5 
PARs That Were Different 0 0 
Test 5 
Opinions Adequate Adequate 
Total Number PARs 5 5 
PARS That Were the Same 5 5 




Adequate ----------*~ 0 • 0-----0----- 0 
Weak 
1 2 3 4 5 
Test Case Number 
* - Actual Audit Data 
- Expert System Choice 
o - Actual and Expert System are identical 
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Test Case Number 
* - Actual Audit Data 
- Expert System Choice 
o - Actual and Expert System are identical 





1 2 3 4 5 
Test Case Number 
Figure 10. Graph of PARs That Were Different Comparison 
Test 1 
The first set of test data resulted in receiving the 
same opinion in both systems and most of the PARs were a 
one-for-one match. The expert system found one additional 
PAR which was a valid finding. The original auditor had 
noted the problem in the workpapers, but chose not to write 
a PAR because the group being audited had already initiated 
a corrective action prior to the audit. The findings were 
similar, but the expert system PARs did not contain the same 
level of explanation for the finding and exposure. 
Test 2 
The second test found the same problems as in the 
actual audit. The number of PARs differ because when they 
were written they were grouped differently. The audit 
opinions were different. The expert system gave an adequate 
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because it did not assess the significance of the PARs to 
this particular audit. A particular finding may vary in 
importance depending on the type of network. Again, the 
system found basically the same findings as the actual audit 
data. 
Test 3 
The third test resulted in an adequate opinion for both 
the expert system and the actual audit data. The same areas 
of exposure were identified by both. The difference in the 
number of PARs is due to the way the PARs were written. The 
expert system treated the problem as one item with multiple 




The fourth test resulted in an adequate opinion for 
both the expert system and the actual audit data. The same 
areas of exposure were identified by both. This time it was 
the expert system that had two PARs for the same exposures 
that were covered in one PAR in the actual audit data. 
Test 5 
The fifth test resulted in an adequate opinion for both 
the expert system and the actual audit data. Five PARs 
covering the same exposures were found in both the actual 
and the test. Once again, this was not a one-per-one match 
due to grouping the PARs differently. 
Recap 
The expert system did a good job of identifying the 
correct opinion in most cases. In four of the five test 
cases, the same audit opinion was reached. In the case 
where a different opinion was given, it was due to the 
expert system giving a high level of significance to a 
finding that, in this case, was a minor problem. This 
points out a need for the expert system to provide a measure 
of sensitivity for at least some of the exposures being 
reviewed. 
The outcome of the testing in relation to PARs is very 
good, since the same exposures were found in almost all 
cases. There was only one exposure that the expert system 
found that had purposely been ignored by the auditor 
performing the audit. This does not really present a 
problem since the auditor should always review the findings 
of the expert system and agree with them before distributing 
them to the audit client. 
Another factor identified was the PARs generated by the 
expert system generally did not have as detailed a 
description of the finding, exposure, and recommendation. 
This is because the the expert system obtains less 
background information relating to an exposure than that 
generally obtained by an auditor. The PAR as written by the 
expert system is still useful. It provides a template for 
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adding specifics. This can help achieve more uniform PARs. 
Writing style also played a role in causing the 
difference in the number of PARs written. Again, while the 
expert system may not be able to write a final copy PAR, it 
can provide the framework that will cause exposures to 
consistently be segregated in the same PARs from one audit 
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to the next. 
One of the things discovered while testing the program 
is that it is sometimes necessary to answer a question as 
"not applicable". This feature has not been included in the 
system. It would be possible to allow for this option using 
Insight 2 + production rule language. 
Another feature that would make the system more user 
friendly would be to allow the user to change their answers 
to questions. This would occur in a field situation. The 
auditor might get inaccurate information that is later 
corrected. 
To do this, there would probably need to be a menu 
system added to the knowledge data base that would allow the 
system to forget the facts associated with a particular 
question. This would cause the system to prompt the user 
and to process through the knowledge base with the new user 
responses. 
User Training 
In the author's opinion the Insight 2 + based expert 
system is relatively easy to use, so little user training is 
needed. Ease of use would be evaluated during field 
testing. Some basic instruction on the use cf the various 
PF keys is useful. This instruction has been included in 
the expert system title screen. A copy of this title screen 
can be found at Appendix E. 
Operations and Maintenance 
The system is operated by the user by responding to 
questions from the expert system. As the user progresses, 
their responses are recorded and they are shown any 
potential audit exceptions. When the goal of reviewing all 
areas has been reached, the system stops. The user must 
then run a basic program to create the workpaper and report 
files. The auditor should review the PARs generated by the 
system and, as necessary, make adjustments to the PARs to 
more completely describe the findings, exposures, and 
recommendations. 
35 
Expert system maintenance has been made easier by 
segregating each area of questions into a separate knowledge 
base. Also, common control issues are segregated within 
each knowledge base. This should make it easier to 
determine what portion of the knowledge base needs updating. 
The modularity of the knowledge base makes maintenance 
easier for several reasons. First, mistakes can affect less 
of the system. Only facts that have been declared as 
"shared" can be affected by another module. This reduces 
the time it takes to test the system after a change, since 
less of it will need to be tested. Second, the smaller size 
of modules relative to one large knowledge base reduces the 
time it takes to edit and compile the knowledge base. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Conclusion 
Today, computers are being widely used by the audit 
profession. This has led to the use of electronic 
spreadsheets, word processors, data base applications, and 
E-mail. A relatively new field is the development of audit 
expert systems. These systems automate the audit process by 
analyzing audit data and generating recommendations. These 
systems have many potential benefits, including the 
following: 
o Reduced cost 
o Faster audits 
o Higher quality audits 
o More consistent quality 
o New auditor training 
o Providing time for new services 
o Preservation of expertise 
This study determined the features needed in an expert 
system that will be used by internal auditors and 
implemented these features by developing an expert system 
for auditing data communications networks. The features 
needed in an audit expert system are the following: 
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o Collect and evaluate audit evidence 
o Document user input 
o Process uncertain user input 
o Explain why conclusions are drawn in a way that will 
train new auditors 
o Identify audit exceptions and determine which should go 
in the final report 
o Determine the audit opinion 
These features were implemented in an expert system 
that can be used to assist an EDP auditor in performing an 
audit of a data communications network. Testing of the 
system showed that it could find the same exposures as an 
auditor using an "audit program" as a guide. 
There were some differences between the actual audit 
data and that generated by the expert system, but most of 
these were minor differences. Some differences could be 
resolved through further enhancement of the knowledge base. 
Enhancement of the data base is planned to allow for changes 
in the audit profession. 
One area in which the expert should be especially 
helpful is the training of new auditors. The explanation 
facility is a vast improvement over what auditors would have 
to do to research a question in an "audit program". 
Another positive aspect of the system is that it should 
help achieve consistency in findings, recommendations, and 
opinions. Furthermore, since the findings are drafted, it 
should speed up the administrative task of writing the PARs 
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and audit report. 
It is worth noting the Insight 2 + expert system shell 
functioned well during the study. It had good diagnostic 
features and many advanced features that were useful in 
implementing the system. 
Future Work 
There are several areas where additional work could be 
performed. One area would be to arrange to test the system 
in the field using live audit data and personnel with 
varying levels of experience in both the EDP audit 
profession and in performing data communications audits. 
This would more thoroughly test the system and probably 
result in additional enhancements to the system. 
Another area where work could be done would include 
development of additional knowledge bases with specific 
rules for reviewing IBM, DEC, HP, and LAN networks. These 
areas will not always need to be reviewed in a data 
communications audit so they can be run via the Insight 2 + 
CHAIN command, depending on user responses to queries from 
the main knowledge base. 
Another useful, but nonessential, feature that could be 
added to the system is a menu system for skipping from one 
part of the knowledge base to another. This menu system 
could also simplify the process of saving the expert system 
responses when a user wants to stop in the middle of the 
session. 
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Two more possible features would be to allow "not 
applicable" to be answered to a question so that it could be 
skipped and to provide access to a text editor while 
answering a question so an explanatory note could be 
written. 
Another feature would be to create a data base that 
would show how often each audit finding has been found in 
previous audits. This would provide the expert system user 
with some measure of the frequency an exposure is cited. 
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DATA COMMUNICATIONS AUDIT PROGRAM 
I. AUDIT OBJECTIVES 
A. The data communications system (or network) 
directly affects the computing environment by 
determining who can access a computing resource. 
Appropriate controls must be in place to prevent 
unauthorized use or disruption of the data net-
work. 
B. Data transported throughout a communications 
network is vulnerable to a variety of exposures, 
from unauthorized disclosure to lost or corrupted 
data, because of network failure. Any error in 
message transmission, reception, or content must 
be detected. Detected errors must be reported to 
network operations personnel. 
c. Proper controls are needed to preserve data (or 
message) integrity while under control of the 
network. The goal of data integrity is to ensure 
only valid and authorized data can be received or 
transmitted and that transmitted data is identical 
to received data. 
II. CONTROL ISSUES 
A. The makeup of most networks necessitates a network 
control group. This group should be responsible 
for the network's continuing operation, resolution 
of daily problems, and consulting with users on 
network operation. 
B. Access controls are needed for both physical and 
operational access. Physical controls ensure a 
secure environment and prevent unauthorized access 
to network components, such as terminals, modems, 
communication lines, etc. Operational controls 
provide a second level of defense by securing 
communication software, controlling dial-up ports, 
limiting information displayed on network sign-on 
screens, and securing user identification codes 
and passwords. 
c. Data authorization is a key element of network 
security. An authorization process should employ 
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proper checks and approvals before a message is 
allowed to enter the network. 
D. Performance monitoring provides two useful infor-
mation sources. First, network reliability can be 
determined from performance data. Network 
reliability (and thus availability) directly 
affects data integrity. Second, performance data 
can be used to generate audit trails, thereby 
allowing tracing of transactions, reporting 
accesses, and identifying exception conditions. 
III. ADMINISTRATIVE 
A. Obtain an organization chart and identify the 
network manager or owner. What are the responsi-
bilities associated with this position? A general 
ELIS standard requires telecommunications networks 
to have a designated owner. 
B. Obtain and review network policy statements and 
associated procedures. Do they cover: 
1. Dial-up access using public telephone servic-
es? Uncontrolled dial ports make the 
computer network vulnerable to outside 
attacks. 
2. Home access and other off premises access? 
Policy and procedures should dictate off 
premise computing requirements so they can be 
applied prudently and consistently. 
3. Access via intelligent terminals, such as 
personal computers? Intelligent terminals 
can store access information to automate host 
access. Although this may simplify the 
log-in process, it can create unnecessary 
exposures. 
4. Confidentiality of network access methods? 
Information such as dial-up telephone num-
bers, passwords, PINS, etc., must be kept 
confidential. 
5. Other topics to consider which might affect 
network security and/or operation: 
a. Individuals authorized to access the 
network. 
b. Individuals who support the network, 
including administering/monitoring 
security concerns. 
c. Connections to the network from 
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uncontrolled locations. 
d. Connections to the network by other 
networks. 
e. Encryption of confidential information 
to protect during transmission and 
storage. 
Note: if documented procedures are not available, 
describe general practices. 
c. Obtain a description of the data communications 
network. This often comes in the form of a 
blueprint or similar graphical representation. If 
the network is extremely large, a graphical 
description of the network may not be available or 
even practical to review. The intent of this step 
is to familiarize yourself with the network - what 
it does and where it goes. 
1. Destination of lines from communications 
controllers. 
2. Port address, type, location, etc., for all 
dial-up access. 
D. Determine if peer network security reviews are 
performed. 
E. Are suspected security violations passed on to a 
security officer and (when appropriate) the 
Regional EDP Audit Manager for resolution? 
F. Is there a policy established requiring that users 
log off before leaving a terminal? 
G. Is the network used to restrict access to particu-
lar terminals during scheduled business hours? Is 
supervisory approval needed to bring a terminal up 
outside scheduled operating hours? How is this 
controlled? 
H. Are there written procedures to follow for start-
ing and stopping the network? 
I. Is an operations manual available which cross-ref-
erences error messages and suggested corrective 
actions? 
J. Describe procedures used to maintain network 
nodes, such as the addition of new nodes and 
removal of inactive nodes. 
K. Obtain a description of the addressing scheme used 
by the network. An understanding of how CPUs know 
which terminals they are communicating to can aid 
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in understanding and defining audit trails. 
L. What procedures are in place to control both 
company and non-company personnel (such as custom-
ers, contractors, business partners, suppliers, 
etc.) who may have authorized access to specific 
nodes in the network? Consider the following: 
1. Requirements for granting access to the 
network .. 
2. Monitoring the need for continued access. 
3. Revocation of network access when no longer 
needed. This includes returning RPG and 
Secure ID Cards, suspension of network 
account codes and passwords, and disabling 
auto-callback devices. 
M. Are network facilities such as trace, diagnostic, 
and monitor adequately controlled? Are any 
associated sensitive data files protected? 
Note: Network support personnel generally have 
powerful privileges which might be easily used to 
obtain confidential information. For example: 
most network diagnostic tool kits include trace 
facilities. Tracing data on a communication line 
can reveal user account codes, passwords, and 
other confidential information. Access to these 
tools should be limited to only those individuals 
whose job function requires such access. 
IV. NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL 
A. Identify controls in place to authenticate network 
users. In particular, review dial-up access to 
the network. 
1. Describe the type of dial-up access allowed. 
2. If dial-up ports are allowed, how are they 
controlled? Some methods for controlling 
include: 
a. Manual controls - operator en-
abled/disabled modems or ports. 
b. Auto-callback modems. 
c. Auto-callback systems - such as DEFENDER 
II. 
d. Personal identification devices - such 
as Secure ID Card or Micro-Frame's 
Passkey, a random password generator 
(RPG). 
e. PBX controlled numbers. 
f. Terminal identification via information 
encoded in the terminal hardware. 
47 
Note: Unprotected dial ports expose the network, 
and thus the host computing facilities, to access 
attempts by unauthorized individuals (defined to 
include company and non-company personnel). A key 
word here is access attempts. In most cases, the 
"hacker" must pass through the host's own access 
control security, such as an account code and 
password. This might offset the need for network 
access controls in some cases, but also places 
added emphasis on strong host access control 
security to prevent break-ins. 
Note2: A second concern deals with audit trails. 
If someone is trying to break in, sufficient 
information may not be available to identify who. 
Further, if a break-in attempt is successful, 
knowledge of what transpired (including potential 
damage) may never surface. 
Note3: Dial-up and callback control mechanisms 
are vulnerable to call forwarding and call trans-
fer. Generally, additional controls are needed 
from the PBX service to disable these special 
phone features. 
B. What type of control tables are used to support 
the network? Consider the following: 
1. Password tables used to verify the calling 
party on network servers, host computers, or 
other communications servers. 
a. Are passwords encrypted during storage 
and transmission? 
b. Review other characteristics about 
password usage, selection, definition, 
etc. 
2. Routing or pooling tables used to selectively 
route traffic through the network. 
Identify where the tables reside and their format. 
How are the tables maintained? What controls 
protect the tables from unauthorized access, 
including individuals responsible for maintenance. 
c. Are terminals defined to specific applications or 
hosts? 
V. NETWORK HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE CONTROLS 
A. Are alternative facilities available when communi-
cation failures occur? 
B. Are scrambling or encryption techniques used? 
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c. Are backup modems maintained at critical communi-
cation points? 
D. For communications controller software: 
1. Are there procedures to activate/deactivate 
lines? 
2. What line protocols are permitted? 
3. Identify controller software types in use. 
4. Determine whether security is adequate over 
access and changes. 
E. For network communications software: 
1. Identify types in use. 
2. Determine whether security is adequate over 
access and changes. 
F. Are network facilities secured and physical access 
limited to authorized persons? Network facilities 
include wiring cabinets, telephone closets, 
switching rooms, etc., in office buildings and any 
other facility involved in data communications. A 
representative review of these areas may be 
appropriate. 
G. Are all communication software libraries: 
1. Protected against unauthorized access? 
2. Backed up on a regular basis? 
VI. NETWORK PERFORMANCE MONITORING 
A. Identify transmission logs. 
1. Do they cover transmission errors? 
2. Do they cover time capacity problems? 
B. Is the network control log reviewed for operator 
activities? 
c. Are line usage records, diagnostic messages, and 
processing statistics maintained? 
D. How are lines selected for performance require-
ments and specific uses? 
E. Are modems equipped with loop-back switches which 
help determine whether a failure or an increase in 
errors is being caused by the modem itself or the 
line to which the modem is connected? 
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APPENDIX B 
LOG PROGRAM LISTING 
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LOG PROGRAM LISTING 
10 OPEN "I",l,"C:\PRL\OPIN.ASC" 
20 OPEN 11 0 11 ,2,"C:\PRL\TEMP.ASC" 
30 COLOR 15,1,1 
40 CLS 
50 PRINT," II 
60 PRINT, 11 11 
70 PRINT,"Please wait while audit report and workpapers 
are being created" 
80 IF EOF(1) GOTO 130 
90 LINE INPUT#1,A$ 
100 IF EOF(1) GOTO 130 
110 PRINT#2,A$ 
120 GOTO 90 
130 CLOSE #1 
140 OPEN "I",1,"C:\PRL\RPTA.ASC" 
150 IF EOF(l) GOTO 200 
160 LINE INPUT#1,A$ 
170 IF EOF(l) GOTO 200 
180 PRINT#2,A$ 
190 GOTO 160 
200 CLOSE #1 
210 OPEN "I",1,"C:\PRL\RPTB.ASC" 
220 IF EOF(l) GOTO 270 
230 LINE INPUT#1,A$ 
240 IF EOF(l) GOTO 270 
250 PRINT#2,A$ 
260 GOTO 230 
270 CLOSE #1 
280 OPEN "I",1,"C:\PRL\RPTBB.ASC" 
290 IF EOF(l) GOTO 340 
300 LINE INPUT#l,A$ 
310 IF EOF(l) GOTO 340 
320 PRINT#2,A$ 
330 GOTO 300 
340 CLOSE #1 
350 OPEN "I",l,"C:\PRL\RPTC.ASC" 
360 IF EOF(l) GOTO 410 
370 LINE INPUT#1,A$ 
380 IF EOF(l) GOTO 410 
390 PRINT#2,A$ 
400 GOTO 370 
410 CLOSE #1 
420 OPEN "I",1,"C:\PRL\RPTD.ASC" 
430 IF EOF(l) GOTO 480 
440 LINE INPUT#l,A$ 
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450 IF EOF(l) GOTO 480 
460 PRINT#2,A$ 
470 GOTO 440 
480 CLOSE #1 
490 OPEN "I",1,"C:\PRL\RPTE.ASC" 
500 IF EOF(l) GOTO 550 
510 LINE INPUT#l,A$ 
520 IF EOF(l) GOTO 550 
530 PRINT#2,A$ 
540 GOTO 510 
550 CLOSE #1 
560 CLOSE #2 
570 OPEN "I",l,"C:\PRL\TEMP.ASC" 
580 OPEN 11 0 11 ,2,"C:\PRL\REPORT.ASC" 
590 OPEN 11 0 11 ,3,"C:\PRL\WORK.ASC" 
600 IF EOF(l) GOTO 720 
610 LINE INPUT#l,A$ 
620 IF EOF(l) GOTO 720 
630 B$=MID$(A$,1,1) 
640 I=LEN(A$) 
650 IF I>O THEN I=I-1 
660 C$=MID$(A$,2,I) 
670 I=VAL(B$) 
680 IF I=l THEN GOTO 610 
690 IF I=2 THEN PRINT#2,C$ 
700 IF I<>2 THEN PRINT#3,A$ 
710 GOTO 610 
720 PRINT," II 
730 PRINT," II 









WORKPAPER TEST RESULTS 
TEST 1 
Subject: 7KTK - Data Communications Review 
TST1 Site: 
Location: Test Location 1 
TEST01 Assignment: 
Audit Work Documentation 
============================================================ 
ADMINISTRATION 
A Network ownership has not been specifically 
defined. However, the implicit network owner is: 
Shared responsibility by system programming staff. 
See 
B-1-1. 
B Policy review 
B.1 Dial access is allowed on the network. 
policy that covers dial access control. 
policy is referenced at: 
B-1-1 
There is a 
This 
B.2 Off premise or home access is allowed and there is 
a policy covering this type of access. The policy 
is referenced at: 
B-7-2 
Off premise or home access is allowed and there is 
a policy covering this type of access. Compliance 
with the policy was reviewed and no problems were 
found. Documentation of the compliance review can 
be found at: 
B-7-2 
B.3 Intelligent terminals or PCs are used and there is 
a policy covering this type of access. The policy 
is referenced at: 
B-8 and B-9 
Intelligent terminals or PCs are used and there is 
a policy covering this type of access. Compliance 
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to this policy was tested and no problems were 
found. This documentation is at: 
B-9 
B.4 A policy exists requiring users to keep network 
access methods such as phone numbers, userids, and 
passwords confidential. This policy is referenced 
at: 
B-8 and B-9 
A policy exists requiring users to keep network 
access methods such as phone numbers, userids, and 
passwords confidential. Several users were 
reviewed and they are in compliance with the 
policy. The workpapers for this compliance test 
can be found at: 
B-9 
B.5 Inter-connections to other networks are allowed. 
A policy covering this type of access is 
available. It is referenced at: 
B-1-2 
c. You have said there is adequate hardware 
documentation for routine maintenance of the 
network hardware and for contingency planning 
purposes. This documentation is kept current 
through regular maintenance procedures. 
D. There is no peer review of the network. This 
question is for information only and does not show 
any control weakness. 
E. Network security violations are NOT normally 
reviewed with auditing. This should be discussed 
with the audit client to assure them that auditing 
is available to assist them in researching their 
security problems. Also, auditing can make 
security weaknesses and their solutions known to 
other company sites. 
F. There is a policy requiring users to log off a 
terminal before leaving. See policy referenced 
at: 
B-3 
G. There are no terminals where it is feasible to 
restrict them to specific applications to improve 
network control. 
H. There is good network operator documentation that 
provides the operator help with error messages, 
instructions for starting and stopping the 
network. Operator procedures are referenced at: 
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B-6-1 
There is good network operator documentation and a 
review of a sample of this documentation shows it 
is being kept up to date. Compliance testing 
docqmentation can be found at: 
B-6-2 
I. Network update procedures were reviewed and they 
did not meet the following criteria: 
The update process is well documented. 
A list of approved network hardware has been 
developed and is maintained as a guideline to 
network device procurement. 
The update is done in a way that allows a 
quick return to the previous configuration if 
there are problems. 
All changes are well commented with the 
software. 
See PAR 1. 
J. The addressing scheme is secure and does not allow 
masquerading as an authorized device. The 
addressing scheme is documented at: 
B-1-4 
K. Physical security does not meet all of the 
following requirements. 
communications equipment is housed in areas 
where access is limited to appropriate 
personnel (all equipment except terminals) . 
These areas are locked when no one is present 
in the area. 
This places network integrity and security at 
risk. See PAR 2. 
L. Contractors who work on communications equipment 
are escorted by company personnel while on site. 
B-1-4 
M. Monitoring hardware and software usage was 
reviewed. Its use is not adequately controlled so 
only authorized individuals have access to trace 
facilities and data. See PAR 3. 
N. Security of network software was reviewed and 
problems were found. Documentation of this review 
can be found at: 
B-1-6 
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See PAR 4. 
NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL 
A. Dial access is allowed on the network. A 
description of the types of dial access allowed 
can be found at: 
B-1-4 
B. There is dial access to the network, but there is 
adequate host security for the application and 
data on the network. Thus, dial access security 
measures are not required. 
c. Manual activation/deactivation of lines is not 
used to protect dial-in lines 
See item B above 
D. Callback modems are used to protect dial-in lines. 
Since callback is used as a method of control, the 
outgoing ports must be protected from someone 
calling in on those phone numbers. If this is 
allowed, they may be able to obtain access without 
going through the callback procedure. The 
compliance test found the outgoing ports and 
modems are adequately protected from this 
exposure. Documentation of this compliance test 
can be found at: 
B-1-4 
E. Random password generators are not used to protect 
dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
F. Captive accounts that limit exposure of dial 
access are not used to protect dial in lines 
See item B above 
G. PBX/network passwords are not used to protect 
dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
H. Other adequate control measures are used to 
protect dial-in lines. 
I. The network being reviewed has a method of 
identifying authorized terminals from unauthorized 
terminals and it is being used. For a description 




J. The network being reviewed does not make use of 
control or routing tables. 
NETWORK HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE CONTROLS 
A. A contingency-plan has not been developed that 
adequately provides for the recovery of the 
network in the event of a loss of network 
availability. A contingency plan should cover the 
following items: 
list of personnel responsible for developing 
and maintaining a plan 
list of personnel responsible for completing 
a recovery 
provisions for off-site backup of software, 
data, and documentation needed in the 
recovery 
maintenance of a list of needed spare 
equipment, or agreements with vendors 
regarding lead time to replace equipment 
regular test schedule for plan 
See PAR 5. 
B. Need for backup equipment (spares) has been 
adequately review and implemented. 
c. No scrambling or encryption technique is used. 
D. The update procedure for hardware and software for 
network controllers is adequate to ensure only 
authorized changes are allowed. For a description 
of the update procedure see workpaper reference: 
B-1-6 
NETWORK PERFORMANCE MONITORING 
A. The operator log (if applicable) is reviewed 
regularly for unusual operator activity that could 
indicate unauthorized activities or that 
additional training is necessary. An example log 
can be found at the ~ollowing workpaper reference: 
B-1-8 
B. The network hardware and software error log (if 
applicable) is reviewed regularly to identify 
potential network problems so corrective action 
can be initiated if warranted. A sample of this 




c. Performance monitoring techniques are used on the 








WORKPAPER TEST RESULTS 
TEST 2 
7KTK - Data Communications Review 
TST2 
Assignment: 
Test Location 2 
TEST02 
Audit Work Documentation 
============================================================ 
ADMINISTRATION 
A. Network ownership has been defined. The network 
owner is: 
o. Owner, Senior Analyst, General Purpose Network 
Their duties are: 
Coordinate all network activities with interested 
parties. 
B. Policy review 
B.l Dial access is allowed on the network. 
policy that covers dial access control. 
policy is referenced at: 
B-3 
There is a 
This 
B.2 Off premise or home access is allowed and there is 
a policy covering this type of access. The policy 
is referenced at: 
B-1-1-1 
Off premise or home access is allowed and there is 
a policy covering this type of access. Compliance 
with the policy was reviewed and no problems were 
found. Documentation of the compliance review can 
be found at: 
step not performed 
B.3 Intelligent terminals or PCs are used and there is 
a policy -covering this type of access. The 
policy is referenced at: 
B-3 
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Intelligent terminals or PCs are used and there is 
a policy covering this type of access. Compliance 
to this policy was tested and no problems were 
found. This documentation is at: 
Step not performed 
B.4 A policy exists requiring users to keep network 
access methods such as phone numbers, userids, and 
passwords confidential. This policy is referenced 
at: 
B-3 
There is a policy requiring users to keep network 
access methods such as phone numbers, userids, and 
passwords confidential. However, during a review 
of several users, problems with compliance were 
noted. Documentation of the compliance test can 
be found at: 
B-3 
See PAR 1 
B.5 Inter-connections to other networks are allowed. 
A policy covering this type of access is 
available. It is referenced at: 
B-3 
c. You have said there is adequate hardware 
documentation for routine maintenance of the 
network hardware and for contingency planning 
purposes. This documentation is kept current 
through regular maintenance procedures. 
D. There is no peer review of the network. This 
question is for information only and does not show 
any control weakness. 
E. Network security violations are normally reviewed 
with auditing. 
F. There is a policy requiring users to log off a 
terminal before leaving. See policy referenced 
at: 
B-3 
G. There are no terminals where it is feasible to 
restrict them to specific applications to improve 
network control. 
H. There is good network operator documentation that 
provides the operator help with error messages and 
instructions for starting and stopping the 
network. Operator procedures are referenced at: 
B-7 
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There is good network operator documentation and a 
review of a sample of this documentation shows it 
is being kept up to date. Compliance testing 
documentation can be found at: 
B-7 
I. Network update procedures were reviewed and they 
meet the following criteria: 
The update process is well documented. 
A list of approved network hardware has been 
developed and is maintained as a guideline to 
network device procurement. 
The update is done in a way that allows a 
quick return to the previous configuration if 
there are problems. 
All changes are well commented with the 
software. 
The update procedures are documented at: 
B-4 
A compliance test of network update procedures 
showed they are being followed. See documentation 
of the test at: 
B-4 
J. The addressing scheme is secure and does not allow 
masquerading as an authorized device. The 
addressing scheme is documented at: 
B-1-1-2 
K. Physical security meets the following criteria: 
Communications equipment is housed in areas 
where access is limited to appropriate 
personnel (all equipment except terminals). 
These areas are locked when no one is present 
in the area. 
See documentation at reference: 
B-1-1-4 
L. Contractors who work on communications equipment 
are escorted by company personnel while on site. 
B-3 
M. Monitoring hardware and software usage was 
reviewed. Its use is not adequately controlled so 
only authorized individuals have access to trace 
facilities and data. 
See PAR 2. 
64 
N. Security of network software was reviewed and 
problems were found. Documentation of this review 
can be found at: 
B-1-1-4 
See PAR 3. 
NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL 
A. Dial access is allowed on the network. A 
description of the types of dial access allowed 
can be found at: 
B-1-1-2 
B. There is dial access to the network, but there is 
adequate host security for the application and 
data on the network. Thus, dial access security 
measures are not required. 
c. Manual activation/deactivation of lines is not 
used to protect dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
D. Callback modems are used to protect dial-in lines 
since callback is used as a method of control, the 
outgoing ports must be protected from someone 
calling in on those phone numbers. If this is 
allowed, they may be able to obtain access without 
going through the callback procedure. The 
compliance test found the outgoing ports and 
modems are adequately protected from this 
exposure. Documentation of this compliance test 
can be found at: 
B-1-1-2 
E. Random password generators are used to protect 
dial-in lines. 
F. Captive accounts that limit exposure of dial 
access are not used to protect dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
G. PBX/network passwords are not used to protect 
dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
H. Other adequate control measures are not used to 
protect dial-in lines. 
See item R above 
I. The network being reviewed has a method of 
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identifying authorized terminals from unauthorized 
terminals and it is being used. For a description 
of the terminal id method see the following work-
paper reference: 
B-1-1-4 
J. The network being reviewed does not make use of 
control or routing tables. 
NETWORK HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE CONTROLS 
A. A contingency plan has been developed that 
adequately provides for the recovery of the 
network in the event of a loss of network 
availability. See the following workpaper 
reference for a description of the plan: 
B-3 
B. Need for backup equipment (spares) has been 
adequately reviewed and implemented. 
c. No scrambling or encryption technique is used. 
D. The update procedure for hardware and software for 
network controllers is adequate to ensure only 
authorized changes are allowed. For a description 
of the update procedure, see workpaper reference: 
B-1-1-3 
NETWORK PERFORMANCE MONITORING 
A. The operator log (if applicable) is reviewed 
regularly for unusual operator activity that could 
indicate unauthorized activities or that 
additional training is necessary. An example log 
can be found at the following workpaper reference: 
B-1-1-3 
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B. The network hardware and software error log (if 
applicable) is reviewed regularly to identify 
potential network problems so corrective action can 
be initiated if warranted. A sample of this error 
log can be found at the following workpaper 
reference: 
B-1-1-3 
c. Performance monitoring techniques are used on the 








WORKPAPER TEST RESULTS 
TEST 3 
7KTK - Data Communications Review 
TST3 
Assignment: 
Test Location 3 
TEST03 
Audit Work Documentation 
==========================·================================== 
ADMINISTRATION 
A. Network ownership has been defined. The network 
owner is: 
Network Owner 
Their duties are: 
Coordinate network 
B. Policy review 
B.1 Dial access is allowed on the network. 
policy that covers dial access control. 
policy is referenced at: 
B-15 
There is a 
This 
B.2 Off premise or home access is allowed and there is 
a policy covering this type of access. The policy 
is referenced at: 
B-2 
Off premise or home access is allowed and there is 
a policy covering this type of access. Compliance 
with the policy was reviewed and no problems were 
found. Documentation of the compliance review can 
be found at: 
Test not done 
B.3 Intelligent terminals or PCs are used and there is 
a policy covering this type of access. The policy 
is referenced at: 
B-15 
Intelligent terminals or PCs are used and there is 
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a policy covering this type of access. Compliance 
to this policy was tested and no problems were 
found. This documentation is at: 
Test not done 
B.4 A policy exists requiring users to keep network 
access methods such as phone numbers, userids, and 
passwords confidential. This policy is referenced 
at: 
B-15 
A policy exists requiring users to keep network 
access methods such as phone numbers, userids, and 
passwords confidential. Several users were 
reviewed and they are in compliance with the 
policy. The workpapers for this compliance test 
can be found at: 
Test not done 
B.5 There are no inter-connections to other networks. 
c. You have said there is adequate hardware 
documentation for routine maintenance of the 
network hardware and for contingency planning 
purposes. This documentation is kept current 
through regular maintenance procedures. 
D. There is no peer review of the network. This 
question is for information only and does not show 
any control weakness. 
E. Network security violations are normally reviewed 
with auditing. 
F. There is a policy requiring users to log off a 
terminal before leaving. See policy referenced 
at: 
B-4 
G. There are no terminals where it is feasible to 
restrict them to specific applications to improve 
network control. 
H. There is good network operator documentation that 
provides the operator help with error messages and 
instructions for starting and stopping the 
network. Operator procedures are referenced at: 
B-5 
There is good network operator documentation and a 
review of a sample of this documentation shows it 
is being kept up to date. Compliance testing 
documentation can be found at: 
B-6 
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I. Network update procedures were reviewed and they 
meet the following criteria: 
The update process is well documented. 
A list of approved network hardware has been 
developed and is maintained as a guideline to 
network device procurement. 
The update is done in a way that allows a 
quick return to the previous configuration if 
there are problems. 
All changes are well commented with the 
software. 
The update procedures are documented at: 
B-7 
A compliance test of network update procedures 
showed they are being followed. See documentation 
of the test at: 
Test not done 
J. The addressing scheme is secure and does not allow 
masquerading as an authorized device. The 
addressing scheme is documented at: 
B-7 
K. Physical security meets the following criteria: 
Communications equipment is housed in areas 
where access is limited to appropriate 
personnel (all equipment except terminals). 
These areas are locked when no one is present 
in the area. 
See documentation at reference: 
B-8 
L. Contractors who work on communications equipment 
are escorted by company personnel while on site. 
B-3 
M. Monitoring hardware and software usage was 
reviewed. Its use is not adequately controlled so 
only authorized individuals have access to trace 
facilities and data. 
See PAR 1. 
N. Security of network software was reviewed and 
problems were found. Documentation of this review 
can be found at: 
B-9 
See PAR 2. 
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NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL 
A. Dial access is allowed on the network. A 
description of the types of dial access allowed 
can be found at: 
B-10 
B. Dial access is not adequately secured because none 
of the following types of dial security are used: 
Manual activation/deactivation of dial lines 
Callback modems 
Random password generators 
Captive accounts that limit exposure of dial 
access 
PBX/network passwords 
Other adequate control measures 
See PAR 3. 
c. Manual activation/deactivation of lines is not 
used to protect dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
D. Callback modems are not used to protect dial-in 
lines. 
See item B above 
E. Random password generators are not used to protect 
dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
F. Captive accounts that limit exposure of dial 
access are not used to protect dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
G. PBX/network passwords are not used to protect 
dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
H. Other adequate control measures are not used to 
protect dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
I. The network being reviewed has a method of 
identifying authorized terminals from unauthorized 
terminals and it is being used. For a 
description of the terminal id method, see the 
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following work paper reference: 
B-11 
J. The network being reviewed does not make use of 
control or routing tables. 
NETWORK HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE CONTROLS 
A. A contingency plan has been developed that 
adequately provides for the recovery of the 
network in the event of a loss of network 
availability. See the following workpaper 
reference for a description of the plan: 
B-11 
B. Need for backup equipment (spares) has been 
adequately reviewed and implemented. 
c. No scrambling or encryption technique is used. 
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D. The update procedure for hardware and software for 
network controllers is adequate to ensure only 
authorized changes are allowed. For a description 
of the update procedure, see workpaper reference: 
B-12 
NETWORK PERFORMANCE MONITORING 
A. The operator log (if applicable) is reviewed 
regularly for unusual operator activity that could 
indicate unauthorized activities or that 
additional training is necessary. An example log 
can be found at the following workpaper reference: 
B-13 
B. The network hardware and software error log (if 
applicable) is reviewed regularly to identify 
potential network problems so corrective action can 
be initiated if warranted. A sample of this error 
log can be found at the following workpaper 
reference: 
B-14 
c. Performance monitoring techniques are used on the 





WORKPAPER TEST RESULTS 
TEST 4 
Subject: 7KTK - Data Communications Review 
TST4 Site: 
Location: Test Location 4 
TEST04 Assignment: 
Audit Work Documentation 
============================================================ 
ADMINISTRATION 
A. Network ownership has been defined. The network 
owner is: 
DECnet owner 
Their duties are: 
Manage network 
B. Policy review 
B.1 Dial access is allowed on the network, but there 
is no policy that covers dial access control. The 
network contains sensitive applications that need 
protection. 
See PAR 1. 
B.2 Off premise or home access is allowed and there is 
a policy covering this type of access. The policy 
is referenced at: 
B-2 
Off premise or home access is allowed and there is 
a policy covering this type of access. Compliance 
with the policy was reviewed and no problems were 
found. Documentation of the compliance review can 
be found at: 
Test not done 
B.3 Intelligent terminals or PCs are used and there is 
a policy covering this type of access. The policy 
is referenced at: 
B-3 
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Intelligent terminals or PCs are used and there is 
a policy covering this type of access. Compliance 
to this policy was tested and no problems were 
found. This documentation is at: 
Test not done 
B.4 There is no policy requiring users to keep network 
access methods such as phone numbers, userids, and 
passwords confidential. 
See PAR 2 
B.5. There are no inter-connections to other networks. 
c. You have said there is adequate hardware 
documentation for routine maintenance of the 
network hardware and for contingency planning 
purposes. This documentation is kept current 
through regular maintenance procedures. 
D. There is no peer review of the network. This 
question is for information only and does not show 
any control weakness. 
E. Network security violations are normally reviewed 
with auditing. 
F. There is a policy requiring users to log off a 
terminal before leaving. see policy referenced 
at: 
B-5 
G. There are no terminals where it is feasible to 
restrict them to specific applications to improve 
network control. 
H. There is good network operator documentation that 
provides the operator help with error messages and 
instructions for starting and stopping the 
network. Operator procedures are referenced at: 
B-6 
There is good network operator documentation and a 
review of a sample of this documentation shows it 
is being kept up to date. Compliance testing 
documentation can be found at: 
B-7 
I. Network update procedures were reviewed and they 
meet the following criteria: 
The update process is well documented. 
A list of approved network hardware has been 
developed and is maintained as a guideline to 
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network device procurement. 
The update is done in a way that allows a 
quick return to the previous configuration if 
there are problems. 
All changes are well commented with the 
software. 
The update procedures are documented at: 
B-6 
A compliance test of network update procedures 
showed they are being followed. See documentation 
of the test at: 
B-6 
J. The addressing scheme is secure and does not allow 
masquerading as an authorized device. The 
addressing scheme is documented at: 
B-7 
K. Physical security meets the following criteria: 
Communications equipment is housed in areas 
where access is limited to appropriate 
personnel (all equipment except terminals). 
These areas are locked when no one is present 
in the area. 
See documentation at reference: 
B-8 
L. contractors who work on communications equipment 







hardware and software usage was 
Its use is controlled so only 
personnel can trace data. The types of 
being used can be found at: 
N. Security of network software was reviewed and no 
problems were found. Documentation of this review 
can be found at: 
B-10 
NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL 
A. Dial access is allowed on the network. A 
description of the types of dial access allowed 
can be found at: 
B-11 
B. Dial access is not adequately secured because none 
of the following types of dial security are used: 
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Manual activation/deactivation of dial lines 
Callback modems 
Random password generators 
Captive accounts that limit exposure of dial 
access 
PBX/network passwords 
Other adequate control measures 
See PAR 3. 
c. Manual activation/deactivation of lines is not 
used to protect dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
D. Callback modems are not used to protect dial-in 
lines. 
See item B above 
E. Random password generators are not used to protect 
dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
F. Captive accounts that limit exposure of dial 
access are not used to protect dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
G. PBX/network passwords are not used to protect 
dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
H. Other adequate control measures are not used to 
protect dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
I. The network being reviewed has no method of 
identifying authorized terminals from unauthorized 
terminals. 
J. The network being reviewed does make use of 
control or routing tables. These tables are not 
adequately protected from unauthorized access and 
update. For a description of the control/routing 
table usage, see the following workpaper 
reference: 
B-11 
See PAR 4. 
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NETWORK HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE CONTROLS 
A. A contingency plan has been developed that 
adequately provides for the recovery of the 
network in the event of a loss of network 
availability. See the following workpaper 
reference for a description of the plan: 
B-12 
B. Need for backup equipment (spares) has been 
adequately reviewed and implemented. 
c. No scrambling or encryption technique is used. 
D. The update procedure for hardware and software for 
network controllers is adequate to ensure only 
authorized changes are allowed. For a description 
of the update procedure see workpaper reference: 
B-13 
NETWORK PERFORMANCE MONITORING 
A. There is an operator log, but it is not reviewed 
regularly to identify unauthorized activity or the 
need for additional training. A regular review of 
the log could reduce the exposure to loss of 
service through operator error or unauthorized 
activity. An example log can be found at the 
following workpaper reference: 
B-14 
See PAR 5. 
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B. The network hardware and software error log (if 
applicable) is reviewed regularly to identify 
potential network problems so corrective action can 
be initiated if warranted. A sample of this error 
log can be found at the following workpaper 
reference. 
B-15 
c. Performance monitoring techniques are used on the 





WORKPAPER TEST RESULTS 
TEST 5 
Subject: 7KTK - Data Communications Review 
TST5 Site: 
Location: Test Location 5 
TEST05 Assignment: 
Audit Work Documentation 
============================================================ 
ADMINISTRATION 
A. Network ownership has not been specifically 
defined. However, the implicit network owner is: 
system Programming Group 
B. Policy review 
B.1 Dial access is allowed on the network. 
policy that covers dial access control. 
policy is referenced at: 
B-3 
There is a 
This 
B.2 Off premise or home access is not allowed. 
B.3 Intelligent terminals or PCs are not used on the 
network. 
B.4 A policy exists requiring users to keep network 
access methods such as phone numbers, userids, and 
passwords confidential. This policy is referenced 
at: 
B-5 
A policy exists requiring users to keep network 
access methods such as phone numbers, userids, and 
passwords confidential. 
Several users were reviewed 
compliance with the policy. 
this compliance test can be 
Test not completed 
and they are in 
The workpapers for 
found at: 
B.5 There are no inter-connections to other networks. 
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c. You have said there is adequate hardware 
documentation for routine maintenance of the 
network hardware and for contingency planning 
purposes. This documentation is kept current 
through regular maintenance procedures. 
D. There is no peer review of the network. This 
question is for information only and does not show 
any control weakness. 
E. Network security violations are normally reviewed 
with auditing. 
F. There is a policy requiring users to log off a 
terminal before leaving. See policy referenced 
at: 
Not applicable since there are no terminals 
G. There are no terminals where it is feasible to 
restrict them to specific applications to improve 
network control. 
H. There is good network operator documentation that 
provides the operator help with error messages and 
instructions for starting and stopping the 
network. Operator procedures are referenced at: 
B-5 
There is good network operator documentation and a 
review of a sample of this documentation shows it 
is being kept up to date. Compliance testing 
documentation can be found at: 
B-5 
I. Network update procedures were reviewed and they 
did not meet the following criteria: 
The update process is well documented. 
A list of approved network hardware has been 
developed and is maintained as a guideline to 
network device procurement. 
The update is done in a way that allows a 
quick return to the previous configuration if 
there are problems. 
All changes are well commented with the 
software. 
See PAR 1. 
J. The addressing scheme is secure and does not allow 
masquerading as an authorized device. The 
addressing scheme is documented at: 
B-7 
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K. Physical security meets the following criteria: 
Communications equipment is housed in areas 
where access is limited to appropriate 
personnel (all equipment except terminals). 
These areas are locked when no one is present 
in the area. 
See documentation at reference: 
B-8 
L. Contractors who work on communications equipment 
are escorted by company personnel while on site. 
B-9 
M. Monitoring hardware and software usage was 
reviewed. Its use is not adequately controlled so 
only authorized individuals have access to trace 
facilities and data. 
See PAR 2. 
N. Security of network software was reviewed and 
problems were found. Documentation of this review 
can be found at: 
B-8 
See PAR 3. 
NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL 
A. Dial access is allowed on the network. A 
description of the types of dial access allowed 
can be found at: 
B-9 
B. Dial access is not adequately secured because none 
of the following types of dial security are used: 
Manual activation/deactivation of dial lines 
Callback modems 
Random password generators 
Captive accounts that limit exposure of dial 
access 
PBX/network passwords 
Other adequate control measures 
See PAR 4. 
c. Manual activation/deactivation of lines is not 
used to protect dial-in lines 
See item B above 
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D. Callback modems are not used to protect dial-in 
lines. 
See item B above 
E. Random password generators are not used to protect 
dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
F. Captive accounts that limit exposure of dial 
access are not used to protect dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
G. PBX/network passwords are not used to protect 
dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
H. Other adequate control measures are not used to 
protect dial-in lines. 
See item B above 
I. The network being reviewed has no method of 
identifying authorized terminals from unauthorized 
terminals. 
J. The network being reviewed does not make use of 
control or routing tables. 
NETWORK HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE CONTROLS 
A. A contingency plan has been developed that 
adequately provides for the recovery of the 
network in the event of a loss of network 
availability. See the following workpaper 
reference for a description of the plan: 
B-10 
B. Need for backup equipment (spares) has been 
adequately review and implemented. 
c. No scrambling or encryption technique is used. 
D. The update procedure for hardware and software for 
network controllers is adequate to ensure only 
authorized changes are allowed. For a description 
of the update procedure, see workpaper reference: 
B-4 
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NETWORK PERFORMANCE MONITORING 
A. There is an operator log, but it is not reviewed 
regularly to identify unauthorized activity or the 
need for additional training. A regular review of 
the log could reduce the exposure to loss of 
service through operator error or unauthorized 
activity. An example log can be found at the 
following workpaper reference: 
B-6 
See PAR 5. 
B. The network hardware and software error log (if 
applicable) is reviewed regularly to identify 
potential network problems so corrective action can 
be initiated if warranted. A sample of this error 
log can be found at the following workpaper 
reference: 
B-11 
c. Performance monitoring techniques are used on the 









AUDIT REPORT TEST RESULTS 
Test Auditee 1 
Test Location 1 
TEST 1 
June 2, 1989 
DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
Test -Location 1 
All controls have been reviewed. Based on the 
findings, the overall opinion for data communications 
is an adequate control environment. Detailed audit 
comments are attached for your review. 
Your response to the detail comments is requested 
within sixty days. 
NETWORK UPDATE PROCEDURES 
LOCATION: Test Location 1 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 1 
PAR NO. 1 
Network update procedures were reviewed and they did 
not-meet the following criteria: 
The update process is well documented. 
A list of approved network hardware has been 
developed and is maintained as a guideline to 
network device procurement. 
The update ls done in a way that allows a quick 
return to the previous configuration if there are 
problems. 
All changes are well commented with the software. 
Documentation of the update procedures helps all 
interested parties know what their role in the process 
is. This can reduce the number problems associated 
with changes to the network. 
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We recommend network update procedures be 
documented. 
NETWORK PHYSICAL SECURITY 
LOCATION: Test Location 1 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 1 
PAR NO. 2 
Physical security was reviewed. It does not meet all 
of the following requirements: 
Communications equipment is housed in areas where 
access is limited to appropriate personnel (all 
equipment except terminals). 
These areas are locked when no one is present in 
the area. 
This places network integrity and security at risk. 
We recommend network devices be stored in areas 
with limited access whenever possible. If it is 
not cost justifiable to protect them currently, 
consideration should be given when other 
refurbishing of the area is planned. 
ACCESS TO MONITORING FACILITIES 
LOCATION: Test Location 1 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 1 
PAR NO. 3 
Monitoring hardware and software usage was reviewed. 
It has a valid system use in resolving network 
problems, but it could also be used to obtain 
unauthorized access to confidential data or userids and 
passwords. Its use is not adequately controlled so 
only authorized individuals have access to monitoring 
facilities and data. 
we recommend procedures be established to protect 
the trace hardware and software so unauthorized 
access would be less likely. -
NETWORK SOFTWARE FILE SECURITY 
LOCATION: Test Location 1 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 1 
PAR NO. 4 
Security of network software was reviewed and problems 
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were found that too much access was given to some 
network software files. 
We recommend security of network software files be 
reviewed and be limited on a need to know basis. 
CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
LOCATION: Test Location 1 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 1 
PAR NO. 5 
A contingency plan has not been developed that 
adequately provides for the recovery of the network in 
the event of a loss of network availability. A 
contingency plan helps assure the network can be 
reconstructed in a timely manner. A contingency plan 
should cover items such as the following: 
list of personnel responsible for developing and 
maintaining a plan 
list of personnel responsible for completing a 
recovery 
• provisions for off-site backup of software, data, 
and documentation needed in the recovery 
maintenance of a list of needed spare equipment or 
agreements with vendors regarding lead time to 
replace equipment 
regular test schedule for plan 





AUDIT REPORT TEST RESULTS 
Test Auditee 2 
Test Location 2 
TEST 2 
June 2, 1989 
DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
Test Location 2 
All controls have been reviewed. Based on the 
findings, the overall opinion for data communications 
is an adequate control environment. Detailed audit 
comments are attached for your review. 
Your response to the detail comments is requested 
within sixty days. 
NETWORK ACCESS ROUTINES 
LOCATION: Test Location 2 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 2 
PAR NO. 1 
There is a policy requiring users to keep network 
access methods such as phone numbers, userids, and 
passwords confidential. Compliance with this policy 
was reviewed and problems were noted. Failure to keep 
access methods confidential increases the likelihood 
someone could obtain unauthorized access to systems on 
the network. 
We recommend all users be informed of the 
importance of keeping network access routines 
confidential. 
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ACCESS TO MONITORING FACILITIES 
LOCATION: Test Location 2 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 2 
PAR NO. 2 
Monitoring hardware and software usage was reviewed. 
It has a valid system use in resolving network 
problems, but it could also be used to obtain 
unauthorized access to confidential data or userids and 
passwords. Its use is not adequately controlled so 
only authorized individuals have access to monitoring 
facilities and data. 
We recommend procedures be established to protect 
the trace hardware and software so unauthorized 
access would be less likely. 
NETWORK SOFTWARE FILE SECURITY 
LOCATION: Test Location 2 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 2 
PAR NO. 3 
Security of network software was reviewed and problems 
were found that too much access was given to some 
network software files. 
We recommend security of network software files be 




AUDIT REPORT TEST RESULTS 
Test Auditee 3 
Test Location 3 
TEST 3 
June 2, 1989 
DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
Test Location 3 
All controls have been reviewed. Based on the 
findings, the overall opinion for data communications 
is an adequate control environment. Detailed audit 
comments are attached for your review. 
Your response to the detail comments is requested 
within sixty days. 
ACCESS TO MONITORING FACILITIES 
LOCATION: Test Location 3 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 3 
PAR NO. 1 
Monitoring hardware and software usage was reviewed. 
It has a valid system use in resolving network 
problems, but it could also be used to obtain 
unauthorized access to confidential data or userids and 
passwords. Its use is not adequately controlled so 
only authorized individuals have access to monitoring 
facilities .and data. 
We recommend procedures be established to protect 
the trace hardware and software so unauthorized 
access would be less likely. 
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NETWORK SOFTWARE FILE SECURITY 
LOCATION: Test Location 3 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 3 
PAR NO. 2 
Security of network software was reviewed and problems 
were found that too much access was given to some 
network software files. 
We recommend security of network software files be 
reviewed and be limited on a need to know basis. 
DIAL ACCESS SECURITY 
LOCATION: Test Location 3 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 3 
PAR NO. 3 
Dial access is not adequately secured because none of 
the following types of dial security are used: 
Manual activation/deactivation of dial lines 
Callback modems 
Random password generators 
Captive accounts that limit exposure of dial 
access 
PBX/network passwords 
Other adequate control measures 
Dial access security reduces the likelihood of 
unauthorized access to sensitive data and applications 
on the network. 
We recommend a review of dial security measures be 
completed and, if cost effective, dial access 




AUDIT REPORT TEST RESULTS 
Test Auditee 4 
Test Location 4 
TEST 4 
June 2, 1989 
DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
Test Location 4 
All controls have been reviewed. Based on the 
findings, the overall opinion for data communications 
is an adequate control environment. Detailed audit 
comments are attached for your review. 
Your response to the detail comments is requested 
within sixty days. 
DIAL ACCESS POLICY 
LOCATION: Test Location 4 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 4 
PAR NO. 1 
Dial access is allowed on the network, but no policy 
has been written covering its control. The corporate 
computing policy does not require dial access 
protection. However, this network has sensitive 
applications that may not be adequately protected by 
available host security. 
Development of a dial access policy that addresses dial 
access risks may reduce the risk of outside attacks. 
We recommend a dial access policy be developed 
that addresses the need for greater dial access 
controls. 
97 
NETWORK ACCESS ROUTINES 
LOCATION: Test Location 4 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 4 
PAR NO. 2 
There is no policy requiring users to keep network 
access methods such as phone numbers, userids, and 
. passwords confidential. This increases the likelihood 
someone could obtain unauthorized access to systems on 
the network. 
We recommend a policy be adopted to treat network 
access routines as confidential. 
DIAL ACCESS SECURITY 
LOCATION: Test Location 4 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 4 
PAR NO. 3 
Dial access is not adequately secured because none of 
the following types of dial security are used: 
Manual activation/deactivation of dial lines 
Callback modems 
Random password generators 
Captive accounts that limit exposure of dial 
access 
PBX/network passwords 
Other adequate control measures 
Dial access security reduces the likelihood of 
unauthorized access to sensitive data and applications 
on the network. 
We recommend a review of dial security measures be 
completed and, if cost effective, dial access 
security be implemented. 
NETWORK CONTROL TABLE 
LOCATION: Test Location 4 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 4 
PAR NO. 4 
The network being reviewed uses control or routing 
tables. These tables are not adequately protected from 
unauthorized access and update. This could allow 
unauthorized changes to be made to the network which 
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could disrupt normal network operations and make future 
maintenance more difficult. 
We recommend access controls over the control 
table be reviewed and that access be limited to 
those who need the access to perform their jobs. 
NETWORK OPERATOR LOG 
LOCATION: Test Location 4 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 4 
PAR NO. 5 
There is an operator log, but it is not reviewed 
regularly to identify unauthorized activity or the need 
for additional training. A regular review of the log 
could reduce the exposure to loss of service through 
operator error or unauthorized activity. 





AUDIT REPORT TEST RESULTS 
Test Auditee 5 
Test Location 5 
TEST 5 
June 2, 1989 
DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
Test Location 5 
All controls have been reviewed. Based on the 
findings, the overall opinion for data communications 
is an adequate control environment. Detailed audit 
comments are attached for your review. 
Your response to the detail comments is requested 
within sixty days. 
NETWORK UPDATE PROCEDURES 
LOCATION: Test Location 5 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 5 
PAR NO. 1 
Network update procedures were reviewed and they did 
not meet the following criteria: 
The update process is well documented. 
A list of approved network hardware has been 
developed and is maintained as a guideline to 
network device procurement. 
The update is done in a way that allows a quick 
return to the previous configuration if there are 
problems. 
All changes are well commented with the software. 
Documentation of the update procedures helps all 
interested parties know what their role in the process 
is. This can reduce the number problems associated 
with changes to the network. 
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We recommend network update procedures be 
documented. 
ACCESS TO MONITORING FACILITIES 
LOCATION: Test Location 5 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 5 
PAR NO. 2 
Monitoring hardware and software usage was reviewed. 
It has a valid system use in resolving network 
problems, but it could also be used to obtain 
unauthorized access to confidential data or userids and 
passwords. Its use is not adequately controlled so 
only authorized individuals have access to monitoring 
facilities and data. 
We recommend procedures be established to protect 
the trace hardware and software so unauthorized 
access would be less likely. 
NETWORK SOFTWARE FILE SECURITY 
LOCATION: Test Location 5 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 5 
PAR NO. 3 
. Security of network software was reviewed and problems 
were found that too much access was given to some 
network software files. 
We recommend security of network software files be 
reviewed and be limited on a need to know basis. 
DIAL ACCESS SECURITY 
LOCATION: Test Location 5 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 5 
PAR NO. 4 
Dial access is not adequately secured because none of 
the following types of dial security are used: 
Manual activation/deactivation of dial lines 
Callback modems 
Random password generators 
Captive accounts that limit exposure of dial 
access 
PBX/network passwords 
Other adequate control measures 
lC 
Dial access security reduces the likelihood of 
unauthorized access to sensitive data and applications 
on the network. 
We recommend a review of dial security measures be 
completed and, if cost effective, dial access 
security be implemented. 
NETWORK OPERATOR LOG 
LOCATION: Test Location 5 
SUBJECT: DATA COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
DATE PAR SUBMITTED: June 2, 1989 
PAR SUBMITTED TO: Test Auditee 5 
PAR NO. 5 
There is an op~rator log, but it is not reviewed 
regularly to identify unauthorized activity or the need 
for additional training. A regular review of the log 
could reduce the exposure to loss of service through 
operator error or unauthorized activity. 




EXPERT SYSTEM TITLE SCREEN 
104 
EXPERT SYSTEM TITLE SCREEN 
DISPLAY intro 
EXPERT S Y S T E M F 0 R 
AUDITING DAT A C 0 M M U N I C A T I 0 N S 
The following expert system was developed to help auditors 
conduct an audit of the data communications function. This 
system's intent is to supplement the knowledge of the 
auditor by leading the auditor to ask the right questions. 
The system contains the following features: 
o For most questions, the expert system provides an 
additional explanation of the question by pressing F5. 
This option is available whenever it is shown on the 
bottom of the screen. The explanation describes both 
why the question is being asked and provides additional 
background information on the question. The 
explanation facility should be especially helpful to 
auditors who are not experienced in auditing data 
communications. 
PRESS F1 TO ADVANCE TO THE SECOND PAGE OF THE INTRODUCTION 
PRESS F2 TO CONTINUE THE REVIEW 
PRESS F10 AND THEN Fl TO EXIT FROM THE SYSTEM 
o The system prompts the user to answer questions. Most 
questions are TRUE/FALSE questions. Some questions ask 
for entry of a character string, like the name of the 
location being audited. A third type of question uses 
a confidence bar to assess whether an answer is TRUE or 
FALSE. The confidence bar ranges from o to 100 
representing your confidence that the statement is 
true. This type of question is asked when the answer 
is not necessarily 100 percent true or false. 
o Be careful not to accidentally hit the escape key, as 
this will exit from the session and you will have to 
start over. 
o Similarly, avoid the UNKN function key. It has not 
been programmed into the knowledge base and will cause 
the system to exit. 
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o Also, be careful not to use the F3 or FB key as each of 
these will cause you to exit the current line of 
reasoning and restart or go to the menu. 
PRESS Fl TO GO TO THE THIRD PAGE OF THE INTRODUCTION 
PRESS F2 TO CONTINUE THE REVIEW 
PRESS FlO AND THEN Fl TO EXIT FROM THE SYSTEM 
o The system will highlight areas where potential 
problems exist and will make preliminary 
recommendations in the form of a Preliminary Audit 
Report (PAR). Each PAR will be marked as to whether it 
should be included in the final audit report. 
o The expert system will also determine the overall audit 
opinion based on the severity of the findings 
discovered. 
o As stated above, the expert system will recommend both 
problems to document in a PAR and what the opinion 
should be for the audit. Both of these are supplied by 
the system to assist the auditor in completing their 
review. This feature should help to provide · 
consistency in audit findings and opinions from one 
audit to the next. However, the auditor and their 
management should use judgment to determine if they 
agree with the expert system's findings and opinion. 
PRESS Fl TO RETURN TO THE FIRST PAGE OF THE INTRODUCTION 
PRESS F2 TO CONTINUE THE REVIEW 
PRESS F5 TO GET FURTHER INFORMATION ON A QUESTION 
PRESS FlO AND THEN Fl TO EXIT FROM THE SYSTEM 
lC 
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